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Abstract
We show how to calculate the fraction of single photon counts of the 3-intensity decoy-state
quantum cryptography faithfully with both statistical fluctuations and source errors. Our results
only rely on the bound values of a few parameters of the states of pulses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD)[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] has now been extensively studied
both theoretically and experimentally. In practice, if one uses an imperfect single-photon
source with a lossy channel, the security is undermined by the photon-number-splitting
attack [8, 9]. Fortunately, this can be managed by a number of methods[4, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. In particular, the so called ILM-GLLP proof[4, 5] has shown
that if we know the upper bound of fraction of the multi-photon counts (or equivalently, the
lower bound of single-photon counts) among all raw bits, we still have a way to distill the
secure final key. Verifying such a bound is strongly non-trivial. The so called decoy-state
method [10, 11, 12, 13, 14] is to find out such bounds, say, among all those clicks at Bob’s
side, at least how many of them are due to the single-photon pulses from Alice.
The main idea of the decoy-state method is to change intensities randomly among different
values in sending out each pulses. Equivalently, we can regard pulses of different intensities
as pulses from different sources. For example, in a 3-intensity protocol[12], Alice has three
sources, source Y0 (vacuum source) which is supposed to produce vacuum only, source Y
(decoy source) which is supposed to only produce state
ρ =
J∑
k=0
ak|k〉〈k| (1)
only, and source Y ′ (signal source) which is supposed to only produce state
ρ′ =
J∑
k=0
a′k|k〉〈k|, (2)
where |k〉 is the k−photon Fock state and ak ≥ 0, a′k ≥ 0 for all k,
∑
ak =
∑
a′k = 1. Here
J can be either finite or infinite. Given a coherent-state source or a heralded single-photon
source from the parametric down conversion, J =∞.
The fundamental formula in the decoy-state method as first proposed by Hwang[11] is
that the counting rates (yields) of pulses of the same photon-number states must be equal
to each other even they are from different source, i.e.
sk = s
′
k (3)
where sk and s
′
k are counting rate of k−photon pulses from the decoy source and counting
rate of k−photon pulses from the signal source, respectively. This is because of the obvious
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fact that those k−photon pulses from different sources are actually randomlymixed therefore
they are random samples of each other, if sources Y0, Y, Y
′ are perfectly stable, i.e., they
always produce a state precisely as the assumed one. Given Eq.(3), one can list simultaneous
equations[12] for sk based Eqs.(1,2) and then find out the lower bound of s1 (s
′
1) which
indicates the lower bound of single photon counts of the decoy source and signal source.
Given this, one can calculate the final key rate of each source, by the well known result
of ILM-GLLP[4, 5]. For example, the asymptotic final key rate for the signal source can be
calculated by
Rs = ∆
′
1[1−H(t1)]−H(t) (4)
where t1, t are the QBER for single-photon counts of the signal source and the QBER for
all counts of the signal pulses from the signal source. ∆′1 is the lower bound of the fraction
of counts due to single photon pulses from the signal source. Moreover, the non-asymptotic
unconditional secure key rate in a finite-size QKD is extensively studied recently, first in
Ref.[4], and then further studied in [6, 7].
Recently, a number of QKD experiments using the decoy-state method have been done
[21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. However, the story is not completed here because the existing decoy-
state theory does not entirely cover the real experimental conditions in practice. No source
in real-life can be perfectly stable. One important problem is the effect of source errors.
Suppose in a protocol Alice sends out M pulses one by one. The actually produced state at
any time i can differ from the assumed state that she wants. We call this discrepancy source
error. Say, at any time i, Alice wants to prepare a state
ρi =
J∑
k=0
fk|k〉〈k| (5)
for Bob, but the source actually prepares a slightly different state
ρ˜i =
J∑
k=0
fki|k〉〈k| (6)
in the Fock space. We shall call such fki − fk source error, or state error, or parameter
fluctuation. Most generally, the error, fki − fk is not random for different i. In practice,
one of the major cause of the source error is the intensity fluctuation. Therefore we often
use the term intensity fluctuation for the source errors. But our result here is not limited to
the intensity fluctuation only. Here we consider a more general case that the parameters in
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the state fluctuate. Therefore we shall still use the term source error in stead of intensity
fluctuation.
If the source error is random, we can simply assume a perfectly stable source always
emitting the averaged-state[14, 26] of all pulses from a certain source. As shown in Ref.[26],
we have to take a feed-forward control to each individual pulses in order to guarantee the
randomness of source errors. If we use coherent light only, and if we have a stable two-value
attenuator, we can use the method in Ref.[27] to manage any intensity fluctuations.
If we don’t assume any conditions above, the issue need to be studied more carefully.
A very tricky point here is that the elementary assumption of Eq.(3) for the decoy-state
method with stable sources is in general incorrect, if the state errors are not random. As we
have shown explicitly[10, 28], there are cases that Eve. may know the source errors and she
can violate Eq.(3) by producing an instantaneous transmittance channel dependent on the
errors. Therefore, we must seek a solution to the new problem.
Very recently[28], a general asymptotic theory for decoy-state QKD with source errors
is presented. By the method[28], we don’t have to change anything in the existing set-
up. The only thing we need is the bound values of a few parameters in the states from
each source. However, that work has only presented the asymptotic result i.e., the effect
of classical statistical fluctuation is not considered. Besides Ref.[28], the problem is also
studied studied[29] asymptotically from another viewpoint for the Plug-and-Play protocol.
There[29], Alice receives a pulse, attenuates it and sends it out for Bob. Eve controls both
the incident pulse and the outcome pulse. Alice’s transmittance γ in doing attenuation can
be either γD or γS, depending on whether she wants to prepare a decoy pulse or a signal
pulse. Similar to Ref.[27], Ref.[29] also assumes that Alice can do the two-value attenuation
exactly. The fundamental formula assumed there [29]is
Y Dm,n = Y
S
m,n
where Y Dm,n(Y
S
m,n) is the counting rate of a decoy(signal) pulse which contains m photons
when flying into Alice lab and contains n photons when flying away from Alice’s lab, after
Alice’s attenuation. As was pointed out by the authors of Ref.[29], the effects of the internal
fluctuation of Alice’s lab was not considered there and also the validity of elementary equa-
tion Y Dm,n = Y
S
m,n is not studied[30]. Actually, as shown in the appendix of this work, the
elementary equation does not always hold if there are fluctuations to Alice’s attenuation.
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Here in this paper, we study the effects of both source errors and classical statistical
fluctuations. The existing works[28, 29] have not included the effect of statistical fluctuations
in calculating the final key rate, though the effect can be included in principle. Our earlier
work assumes zero error for vacuum source Y0, here we shall assume errors in this source,
besides errors in source Y and source Y ′. Similar to the results in [28], the results presented
here only need the bound values of a few parameters in the states of different sources.
In particular, in deriving the fraction of single-photon counts we don’t use any unproven
assumption and we don’t need worry about the internal fluctuation of any Alice’s device,
since our method only needs the bound values of a few parameters in the source state. We
don’t need to presume any specific distribution for our states. In our study in this work,
classical statistical fluctuation is considered by estimating the observed values from the
asymptotic values with a fixed standard deviation. We shall start with a protocol with
one-way quantum communication only. But as we point out in the end of this paper, our
method obviously also applies to a Plug-and-Play protocol.
This paper is arranged as the following. After the introduction above, we present our
method with some important mathematical relations section II. We then present our main
results in section III: the asymptotic and non-asymptotic formula for the fraction of single
photon counts of the 3-intensity protocol with errors in states of all 3 sources. Some remarks
on the source errors are addressed in section IV. The paper is ended with a concluding
remark.
II. OUR METHOD
We assume that Alice sends M pulses to Bob one by one in the protocol. Each pulse
sent out by Alice is randomly chosen from one of the 3 sources Y0, Y, Y
′ with constant
probability p0, p, p
′, respectively. Each source has errors. Clearly, pM , p′M and p0M are
just the number of the decoy pulses, the number of the signal pulses, and the number of
pulses from the vacuum source, respectively. We assume we know the bounds of parameters
in the states of each sources.
Our goal is to find out the lower bound of the fraction of counts caused by those single-
photon pulses for both the signal source and the decoy source. The following quantities are
directly observed in the protocol therefore we regard them as known parameters: Nd, the
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number of counts caused by the decoy source, Ns, the number of counts caused by the signal
source, and N0, the number of counts caused by the vacuum source, Y0. For our goal, we
only need to formulate the number of counts caused by those single-photon pulses from each
sources in terms of the known quantities N0, Nd, Ns and p0, p, p
′ and the bound values of
those parameters of states in each sources.
A. Virtual protocol
For clarity, we first consider a virtual protocol;
Suppose Alice will send M pulses to Bob in the whole protocol. At any time i (i ∈ [1,M ]),
each source produces a pulse. The states of the pulses from sources Y0, Y , Y
′ are
ρ0i =
J∑
k=0
bki|k〉〈k|, (7)
ρi =
J∑
k=0
aki|k〉〈k| ; and (8)
ρ′i =
J∑
k=0
a′ki|k〉〈k|. (9)
Here b0i is a bit smaller than 1, and we assume b
L
0 , lower bound of all b0i is known in the
protocol; ρi and ρ
′
i are a bit different from ρ and ρ
′ of Eq.(1, 2), which are the assumed
states in the perfect protocol where there is no source error. At any time i, only one pulse
is selected and sent out for Bob. The probability of selecting the ith pulse source Y0, Y or
Y ′ is constantly p0, p, and p
′ for any i. The un-selected two pulses at each time will be
discarded. After Bob has completed all measurements to the incident pulses, Alice checks
the record about which pulse is selected at each time, i.e., which time has used which source.
Obviously, Alice can decide which source to be used at each time in the very beginning. This
is just then the real protocol of the decoy-state method.
As shown below, based on this virtual protocol, we can formulate the number of counts
from each source and therefore find the lower bound of the number of single-photon counts.
The result also holds for the real protocol where Alice decides to use which sources at the
ith time in the very beginning.
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B. Some definitions
Definition 1. In the protocol, Alice sends Bob M pulses, one by one. In response to
Alice, Bob observes his detector for M times. As Bob’s ith observed result, Bob’s detector
can either click or not click. If the detector clicks in Bob’s ith observation, then we say that
“the ith pulse from Alice has caused a count”. We disregard how the ith pulse may change
after it is sent out. When we say that Alice’s ith pulse has caused a count we only need
Bob’s detector clicks in Bob’s ith observation.
Given the source state in Eqs.(8,9), any ith pulse sent out by Alice must be in a photon-
number state. To anyone outside Alice’s lab, it looks as if that Alice only sends a photon
number state at each single-shot: sometimes it’s vacuum, sometimes it’s a single-photon
pulse, sometimes it is a k−photon pulse, and so on. We shall make use of this fact that any
individual pulse is in one Fock state.
Definition 2. Set C and ck: Set C contains any pulse that has caused a count; set ck contains
any k−photon pulse that has caused a count. Mathematically speaking, the sufficient and
necessary condition for i ∈ C is that the ith pulse has caused a count. The sufficient and
necessary condition for i ∈ ck is that the ith pulse contains k photons and it has caused
a count. For instance, if the photon number states of the first 10 pulses from Alice are
|0〉, |0〉, |1〉, |2〉, |0〉, |1〉, |3〉, |2〉, |1〉, |0〉, and the pulses of i = 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10 each has
caused a count at Bob’s side, then we have
C = {i|i = 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, · · ·}; c0 = {i|i = 2, 5, 10, · · ·}; c1 = {i|i = 3, 6, 9, · · ·}. (10)
Clearly, C = c0 ∪ c1 ∪ c2 · · ·, every pulse in set C has caused a count.
Definition 3. We use superscripts U, L for the upper bound and lower bound of a certain
parameter. In particular, given any k ≥ 0 in Eqs.(7,8, 9), we denote xLk , xUk for the minimum
value and maximum value of {xki| i ∈ ck}; and x = b, a, a′. We assume these bound values
are known in the protocol.
C. Some important relations and facts
If the ith pulse is an element of ck, the probability that it is from Y0, Y or Y
′ is
Pvi|k = p0bki
p0bki + paki + p′a
′
ki
,
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Pdi|k = paki
p0bki + paki + p′a
′
ki
,
Psi|k = p
′a′ki
p0bki + paki + p′a′ki
. (11)
We want to formulate the numbers of k-photon counts caused by each sources. Given the
definition of the set ck, this is equivalent to ask how many of pules in set ck come from each
sources. If the ith pulse contain k photons, it can come from any of the 3 sources, Y0, Y or
Y ′. According to Eqs.(7, 8, 9), if the ith pulse contains k-photons, the probability that it
comes from source Y0 is
Pvi|k = bkip0
p0bki + paki + p′a′ki
.
Or, equivalently,
nk0 =
∑
i∈ck
Pvi|k.
Given a finite number of pulses and counts, this equation should be replaced by the
expectation-value equation as
〈N0〉 =
J∑
k=0
∑
i∈ck
Pvi|k (12)
This is the expected number of counts caused by source Y0, since every pulse in {ck} has
caused a count. Therefore we can formulate the expected value of the number of counts
caused by source Y0 by
〈N0〉 =
J∑
k=0
∑
i∈ck
bkip0dki = 〈N∗0 〉+
J∑
k=1
∑
i∈ck
bkip0dki (13)
Here
dki =
1
p0bki + paki + p′a
′
ki
. (14)
N0 is the number of counts due to pulses from source Y0, N
∗
0 = p0
∑
i∈c0
b0id0i is the number
of counts due to those vacuum pulses from source Y0. Similarly, if the ith pulse contains
k photons, it has a probability Pdi|k = pakip0bki+paki+p′a′ki to be from the decoy source, and a
probability of Psi|k = p
′a′
ki
p0bki+paki+p
′a′
ki
to be from the signal source. Therefore we have
〈nkd〉 =
∑
i∈ck
Pdi|k =
∑
i∈ck
pakidki, (15)
for the expected number of counts caused by those k-photon pulses from the decoy source,
and
〈n′ks〉 =
∑
i∈ck
Psi|k =
∑
i∈ck
p′a′kidki, (16)
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for the expected number of counts caused by those k-photon pulses from the signal source.
Therefore, besides Eq.(13) we also have the following 2 equations for 〈Nd〉 and 〈Ns〉 as the
expected values of the number of counts due to the decoy pulses and signal pulses:
〈Nd〉 =
J∑
k=0
∑
i∈ck
Pdi|k = p
J∑
k=0
∑
i∈ck
akidki (17)
〈Ns〉 =
J∑
k=0
∑
i∈ck
Psi|k =
J∑
k=0
∑
i∈ck
a′kidki (18)
Here we have used Eqs.(15, 16).
For simplicity, we define
Dk =
∑
i∈ck
dki =
∑
i∈ck
1
p0bki + paki + p′a′ki
. (19)
Recall Eqs.(16,15), 〈n′0s〉, 〈n0d〉 are the expected number of pulses from the decoy source
and signal source in set c0.
Based on the formulas and definitions above, we find the following important facts:
Fact 1:
paU0 D0 ≥ 〈n0d〉 ≥ paL0D0; p′a′U0 D0 ≥ 〈n′0s〉 ≥ p′a′L0 D0. (20)
This is directly deduced from Eqs.(15,16).
Fact 2:
〈N0〉
bL0 p0
≥ D0 ≥ a
L
1
p0 [aL1 − aL0 (1− bL0 )]
(
〈N0〉 − p0(1− b
L
0 )
paL1
〈Nd〉
)
. (21)
Proof: Obviously,
D0 ≤ 〈N0〉
bL0 p0
. (22)
On the other hand, since any b0i ≤ 1,
p0D0 ≥ 〈N0〉 − p0
J∑
k=1
∑
i∈ck
bkidki ≥ 〈N0〉 − p0
J∑
k=1
bUkDk (23)
To lower bound D0, we only need upper bound p0
∑J
k=1 b
U
kDk. By Eq.(17) we know
p
J∑
k=1
aLkDk ≤ 〈Nd〉 − 〈n0d〉 (24)
which is equivalent to say
p0
bU1
aL1
J∑
k=1
aLkDk ≤
p0b
U
1
paL1
(〈Nd〉 − 〈n0d〉) (25)
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We assume
aLk
bUk
≥ a
L
1
bU1
. (26)
This condition can obviously hold if each pulses of source Y0 is in an extremely weak coherent
state. These conditions mean
p0
J∑
k=1
bUkDk ≤
p0b
U
1
paL1
(
p
J∑
k=1
aLkDk
)
(27)
Therefore, based on Eq.(23,25) we have
p0D0 ≥ 〈N0〉 − p0b
U
1
paL1
(〈Nd〉 − 〈n0d〉) ≥ 〈N0〉 − p0(1− b
L
0 )
paL1
(〈Nd〉 − 〈n0d〉) (28)
Combining fact 1 with Eq.(28), we obtain the following important formula
D0 ≥ a
L
1
p0 [aL1 − aL0 (1− bL0 )]
(
〈N0〉 − p0(1− b
L
0 )
paL1
〈Nd〉
)
. (29)
This completes the proof of fact 2.
Fact 3:
D1 ≥ DL1 =
a′L2 〈Nd〉/p− aU2 〈Ns〉/p′ −
(
a′L2 a
U
0 − aU2 a′L0
)
D0
aU1 a
′L
2 − a′L1 aU2
. (30)
Proof: The startpoint of our proof is Eqs.(17, 18) which can be rewritten into
〈Nd〉 = 〈n0d〉+ paU1 D1 + pΛ− ξ1 (31)
〈Ns〉 = 〈n′0s〉+ p′a′L1 D1 + p′Λ′ + ξ2 (32)
where
Λ =
J∑
k=2
aUk
∑
i∈ck
dki; Λ
′ =
J∑
k=2
a′Lk
∑
i∈ck
dki, (33)
and
ξ1 = p
[
aU1 D1 + Λ−
(∑
i∈c1
a1id1i +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
akidki
)]
≥ 0
ξ2 = p
′
[∑
i∈c1
a′1id1i +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
a′kidki −
(
a′L1 D1 + Λ
′
)] ≥ 0
According to the definition of Λ and Λ′, we also have
Λ′ =
a′L2
aU2
Λ + ξ3 (34)
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and
ξ3 = Λ
′ − a
′L
2
aU2
Λ (35)
Further, we assume the important condition
a′Lk
aUk
≥ a
′L
2
aU2
≥ a
′L
1
aU1
, for all k ≥ 2. (36)
The first inequality above leads to
ξ3 ≥ 0 (37)
as one may easily prove. With Eq.(34), Eq.(32) is converted to
〈Ns〉 = 〈n′0s〉+ p′a′L1 D1 + p′
a′L2
aU2
Λ + ξ2 + p
′ξ3 (38)
Given the Eqs.(31, 38), we can formulate D1:
D1 =
a′L2 〈Nd〉/p− aU2 〈Ns〉/p′ − a′L2 〈n0d〉/p+ aU2 〈n′0s〉/p′ + a′L2 ξ1/p+ aU2 (ξ2 + p′ξ3)/p′
aU1 a
′L
2 − a′L1 aU2
. (39)
Since ξ1, ξ2, and ξ3 are all non-negative, and a
U
1 a
′L
2 − a′L1 aU2 ≥ 0 by the second inequality of
Eq.(36), we now have
D1 =
∑
i∈c1
d1i ≥ a
′L
2 〈Nd〉/p− aU2 〈Ns〉/p′ − a′L2 〈n0d〉/p+ aU2 〈n′0s〉/p′
aU1 a
′L
2 − a′L1 aU2
≥ a
′L
2 〈Nd〉/p− aU2 〈Ns〉/p′ −
(
a′L2 a
U
0 − aU2 a′L0
)
D0
aU1 a
′L
2 − a′L1 aU2
= DL1 . (40)
Here we have used Fact 1 for the bound values of 〈n0d〉, 〈n′0s〉. To minimize D1, we have
replaced 〈n0d〉 by its upper bound and 〈n′0s〉 by its lower bound as given in Fact 1. This
completes the proof of fact 3.
III. MAIN RESULTS
A. Asymptotic result
Given Fact 3, the minimum value of the number of counts caused by single-photon pulses
from the signal-source (or the decoy-source) is simply
〈n′1s〉L = p′a′L1 D1 ≤ 〈n′1s〉, (or 〈n1d〉L = paL1D1 ≤ 〈n1d〉). (41)
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Therefore, we can now bound the fraction of single photon counts among all counts caused
by the signal source
∆′1 ≥
p′a′L1 DL1
〈Ns〉 =
a′L1 (a
′L
2 〈Nd〉p′/p− aU2 〈Ns〉 − p′
(
a′L2 a
U
0 − aU2 a′L0
)
D0
〈Ns〉(aU1 a′L2 − a′L1 aU2 )
. (42)
Here the range of D0 is given by fact 2 in the earlier subsection. We don’t have to replace D0
by its largest possible value to obtain the smallest possible ∆′1 at this moment. Instead, we
shall do numerical calculation by Eq.(4) with all possible values of D0 in the range given by
fact 2 and find the worst case result directly to the key rate. Define S ′ = 〈Ns〉
p′M
as the counting
rate of the signal source, S = 〈Nd〉
pM
as the counting rate of the decoy source, S0 =
〈N0〉
p0M
as the
counting rate of source Y0, and M is the total number of pulses as defined earlier, we can
write the right-hand-side of the inequality in term of counting rates:
∆′1 ≥
a′L1
[
a′L2 S − aU2 S ′ − (a′L2 aU0 − aU2 a′L0 )S0/bL0
]
S ′ (aU1 a
′L
2 − a′L1 aU2 )
(43)
Similarly, we also have
∆1 ≥
aL1
[
a′L2 S − aU2 S ′ − (a′L2 aU0 − aU2 a′L0 )S0/bL0
]
S (aU1 a
′L
2 − a′L1 aU2 )
(44)
for the minimum value of fraction of single-photon counts for the decoy source.
Eqs. (42, 43, 44) and conditions of Eq.(26,36) are the asymptotic results of this work.
B. Non-asymptotic results
Strictly speaking, Eqs.(41, 30) cannot be used in a real experiment where the number of
pulses are always finite. Therefore, in any real experiment we have to consider the effect of
statistical fluctuation besides the effect of source errors.
First, 〈n′1s〉L = p′a′L1 D1 ≥ p′a′L1 DL1 in the formulas is the lower bound of the expected
number of single photon counts of the signal source, but we actually need the lower bound
of n′1s, the (deduced) observed value (i.e., the true value) of the number single photon counts
of the signal source in a certain experiment. Of course, given the expectation value, 〈n′1s〉L,
one can deduce the lower bound n′L1s of the experimental value n
′
1s by classical statistics:
n′1s ≥ n′L1s = 〈n′1s〉 − δ1. (45)
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To be sure that this bound is correct with a probability exponential close to 1, we need set
δ1 considerably large, e.g.,
δ1 = 10
√
〈n′1s〉. (46)
Here 10 standard deviation is chosen simply for convenience rather than a exact cut off point.
As shown in Ref.[12], the probability that the statistical fluctuation exceeds this range is
exponentially close to 0.
Second, in the right hand side of Eq.(30), there are many parameters of expectation values
such as 〈Nd〉, 〈Ns〉, 〈n0d〉, 〈n′0s〉, which are not observed values in one specific experiment.
We need to replace these parameters by the experimentally observed quantities to make the
formula useful. Again, this can be done by using classical statistics. This is to say, we need
consider the largest possible difference between the expectation values and the observed
values due to the statistic fluctuations.
For clarity, we shall use 〈ζ〉 for the statistical expectation value of observable ζˆ, and ζ for
the true value or the observed value in the experiment. For example, we shall use 〈n1d〉 for
the expectation value of the number of counts at Bob’s side due to the single-photon pulses
from the decoy source at Alice’s side. We shall also use the superscript U or L to indicate
the maximum value or minimum value of certain variable. With the following condition,
Pvi|k + Pdi|k + Psi|k = 1, if i ∈ ck (47)
for any k, we can now start to derive our non-asymptotic result. By classical statistics we
know that there exists a real number δd satisfying
Nd = 〈Nd〉+ δd (48)
with a probability exponentially close to 1 if we set
|δd| ≤ δUd = 10
√
〈Nd〉 ≈ 10
√
Nd. (49)
This indicates that
〈Nd〉 = Nd − δd (50)
with a probability exponentially close to 1 that δd is in the range given by Eq.(49). Also,
there exists a real number δ0 satisfying
〈N0〉 = N0 − δ0 (51)
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and |δ0| ≤ 10
√
N0.
In our problem, due to the constraint given in Eq.(47), the fluctuations of each variables
are not independent. This can help us not to overestimate the effects of the fluctuations too
much. Eq.(47) immediately leads to the following identity:
〈Ns〉+ 〈Nd〉+ 〈N0〉 = Ns +Nd +N0. (52)
This is to say, the total population in set C is fixed, but there could be fluctuation in the
population distribution over sources Y0, Y, Y
′. Eq.(52), together with Eq.(50) and Eq.(51)
leads to
〈Ns〉 = Ns − δd − δ0. (53)
We use
n′1s ≥ n˜′1s = 〈n′1s〉L − 10
√
〈n1s〉L. (54)
This is the inequality for the experimental lower bound of the number of single-photon
counts from decoy pulses, where
〈n′1s〉L = p′a′L1 DL1 ≥
p′a′L1
[
a′L2 〈Nd〉/p− aU2 〈Ns〉/p′ −
(
a′L2 a
U
0 − aU2 a′L0
) 〈D0〉]
aU1 a
′L
2 − a′L1 aU2
(55)
and 〈Nd〉, 〈Ns〉 are defined by Eqs.(50,53). The range of 〈D0〉 is given by Fact 2 where the
range of 〈D0〉 is given by Eq.(51). To have the lower bound value of n′1s in Eq.(54) , we only
need put the smallest value of 〈Nd〉 and largest possible values of 〈Ns〉, 〈D0〉 into Eq.(55).
However, we don’t have use the largest possible value of 〈D0〉, because we only need the
worst-case result of the final key rate, rather than the worst-case result in each steps.
According to these we can lower bound the fraction of single-photon counts of the raw
bits caused by signal pulses through equation:
∆′1 ≥
n˜′1s
Ns
(56)
where n˜′1s is defined in Eq.(54) and the ranges of related variables in Eq.(54) can be calculated
by Eq.(55,50,51,53) and Fact 2, if conditions of Eq.(26,36) hold.
For coherent states, if the intensity is bounded by [µL, µU ] for the decoy pulses and
[µ′L, µ′U ] for the signal pulses then
aXk = (µ
X)ke−µ
X
/k!, a′Xk = (µ
′X)ke−µ
′X
/k! (57)
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with X = L, U and k = 1, 2 and
aL0 = e
−µU , aU0 = e
−µL ; a′L0 = e
−µ′U , a′U0 = e
−µ′L (58)
Note that our result is not limited to a coherent state source. To calculate the unconditionally
secure final key rate, one has to combine our result (eq.(56)) with the existing theory of
finite-size QKD[4, 6, 7]. Here we make a loose treatment to show the effects of our Eq.(56)
to the ket rate by adding statistical fluctuation to t and t1 in Eq.(4). Detailed numerical
results using the experimental data of QKD over 102.7 kilometers calculated by our formula
is listed in table I. We treat the experimental data in the following way for key rate of the
signal pulses by Eq.(4): (1)∆′1 can be calculated by Eq.(56) as stated earlier. (2) Half of the
experimental data of signal pulses should be discarded due to the measurement basis mis-
match in the BB84 protocol. (3) Among the remaining half, a quarter of them are consumed
for the bit-flip test and another quarter of them are consumed for the phase-flip test. (4) We
use t0 = t0(µ
′) = 3.580% as the observed value of both bit-flip rate and phase-flip rate. The
final key is distilled from the remaining bits of signal pulses. The number of the remaining
bits is not less than n˜′1s/4 . We use t = t0(µ
′) for the bit-flip rate, and
t1 = t
′
1 + 10
√
4t′1/n˜
′
1s. (59)
and n˜′1s is given by Eq.(54), t
′
1 is
t′1 =
t0 − p
′a′L
0
D0
2N ′s
∆′1
. (60)
We then put all possible values of D0 into Eq.(4) according to Fact 2 and Eq.(51) for the
worst-case result of key rate over D0.
The detailed experimental parameters can be founded in Ref.[22]. For completeness, we
list the main parameters here in table II:
IV. SOME REMARKS ON THE SOURCE ERRORS
By the existing technology, one can indeed use whatever stabilizer to reduce the source
errors considerably. Even with this fact, our theoretical results are still necessary: First,
no technology can guarantee a perfectly stable source. It is also questionable whether any
existing device has been proven to be able to reduce the source errors to a low level which
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TABLE I: Secure key rate (final bits per pulse in the unit of 10−6) vs intensity error upper bound
using the experimental data in the case of 102.7 km [22]. The first row lists different values of
upper bounds of intensity errors, δM , i.e., when we want an intensity x, we can actually create a
pulse of any intensity in the range [x(1−δM ), x(1+δM )]. Other rows list the final key rates, which
are the numbers of final bits per signal pulse after error test, i.e.,
nf
N˜s
where N˜s is the number of
raw bits of signal pulses after error test, nf is the number of final bits distilled from these N˜s raw
bits. R is the asymptotic key rate, R1, R2, R3 are the non-asymptotic key rates with the intensity
of each pulses in Y0 being bounded by 0, 0.5%, 1%, respectively. The intensity fluctuations of any
decoy-pulse and signal pulses are bounded by δM . In the table we have given the results of key
rate while δM ranges from 0 to 3%.
δM 3% 2.5% 2% 1.5% 1% 0.5% 0
R (in 10−6) 11.03 12.09 13.15 14.19 15.23 16.26 17.28
R1 (in 10
−6) 1.536 2.567 3.591 4.607 5.616 6.618 7.614
R2 (in 10
−6) 1.506 2.537 3.561 4.577 5.587 6.589 7.585
R3 (in 10
−6) 1.475 2.507 3.531 4.548 5.557 6.560 7.556
TABLE II: Main parameters and observed results in the experiment of Ref[22]. M : total pulses
sent out by Alice during the experimental time. t0(µ), t0(µ
′): quantum bit error rates (QBER) of
decoy pulses and signal pulses. S′, S, S0: counting rates of the signal pulses, decoy pulses and Y0
pulses.
From the results listed in table I, we find that the effects of source errors to the key rate is not
significant (provided that the source error is not too large.) For example, in the asymptotic case
(results in the first row), if the largest intensity fluctuation is controlled to be less than 0.5%, the
key rate is decreased 17.28 Hz(the data in the last column of the first row ) to 16.26 Hz only(the
data in the second column from the right of the first row). However, the statistical fluctuation
decrease the key rate significantly, given the existing experiment[22]. If we strictly considered the
finite-size effect[4, 6, 7], the key rate would be further decreased. To reduce the effects, one can
increase the number of pulses in the set-up.
M t0(µ
′) t0(µ) S
′ S S0 p
′ p p0
5.222 × 109 3.580% 9.098% 1.262 × 10−4 4.611 × 10−5 6.711 × 10−6 0.5 0.4 0.1
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is exponentially close to 0. If unconditional security is our goal in practice, we must show
quantitatively the effects of any polynomially imperfections. For example, even we can
control the intensity fluctuation to be less than 0.5%, we had better still consider the effects
of intensity fluctuation quantitatively rather than simply trust that the effects are negligible
by intuition. Otherwise, one may ask why the cut off point is 0.5% rather than 0.0001% or
25% ? The security is then standardless. If we disregard the effect of source errors, possibly
we shall encounter the following ridiculous story: Set-up A produces a key rate of 1k/s with
source errors of less than 0.5%, set-up B produces a key rate of 20k/s with source errors
of 25% over the same distance. Do we have to believe that set-up B is better ? With our
theoretical results, such type of issue is immediately resolved because we can calculate the
net final key rate after considering the effects of source errors. Second, with our theoretical
results, we don’t have to blindly take too much costs in improving the source quality. For
example, with our results we now know with strict proof that source intensity fluctuation
less than 0.0001% is not so necessary, since it only improves the key rate negligibly, if we
can already control the errors less than 0.5%. Finally, there are cases Eve. can indeed know
the intensity errors[28]. As explicitly shown in[10, 28], in such cases Eve. can then violates
Eqs.(3) through producing a time-dependent channel transmittance. The situation of the
Plug-and-Play is even more serious: Eve. can actually prepare the error of each pulse then
she can violate Eq.(3) for sure.
V. CONCLUDING REMARK AND DISCUSSIONS
In summary, we have shown how to calculate the lower bound of the fraction of single-
photon counts in the decoy-state quantum key distribution with both source errors and
statistical fluctuations. By our method, all imperfections have been taken into consideration
in the largest possible errors of a few parameters of the source states in the photon number
space. Therefore we only need to know the bound values of a few parameters of sources
instead of assuming exact values of any physical quantity. For example, we don’t have to
assume zero internal fluctuation of of Alice’s attenuation as assumed by earlier works[27, 29].
Obviously, our result here directly applies to the so called Plug-and-Play protocol first
proposed by Gisin et al.. As pointed out in Ref[31, 32], the so called Plug-and-Play protocol
can be made secure if the attenuation factors can be accurately set[29, 33]. However, in
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the Plug-and-Play protocol, Eve. actually knows the error of each individual pulse hence
both the error-free decoy-state theory based on Eq.(3) fails. Also, as shown in the appendix,
if the attenuation factors cannot be set accurately, the result of Ref.[29] also fails but our
theory here works.
Also, in a Plug-and-Play protocol, Alice receives strong pulses from Bob and she needs
to guarantee the exact intensity of the pulse sending to Bob. It is not difficult to check the
intensity, but difficult to precisely correct the intensity of each individual pulses. Our theory
here can help to make it easier[28]: Alice monitors each pulses. She may either choose to do
crude corrections to the pulses or not do any corrections: She simply discards those pulses
whose intensity errors are too large (e.g., beyond 2%), and then use our theory to distill the
final key.
It should be interesting to combine our result with the existing theories on final key
distillation in a finite size QKD[4, 6, 7] for the unconditional final key rate in the finite-size
decoy state QKD with an unstable source.
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VI. APPENDIX
Here we show that the elementary assumption Y Dm,n = Y
S
m,n used in Ref.[29]is incorrect if
the actively controlled attenuation factor is not stable. (Ref.[29] assumes a stable attenuation
controlled actively.) For simplicity, we consider those pulses containing 10 photons when
flying into Alice’s lab and after Alice’s attenuation, containing 1 photon when flying away
from Alice’s lab to Bob. Alice decides to randomly use her transmittance λ = λD = 0.01
to produce a decoy pulse and λ = λS = 0.05 to produce a signal pulse. However, due to
whatever un-controlled cause, there are internal fluctuations of λ value at different times.
Consider the following specific case: to some blocks of pulses (we call these blocks strong
blocks), to all decoy pulses and signal pulses, the real transmittance is a bit larger than
λ, the value that Alice wants, while in some other blocks (we call weak blocks) the real
transmittance is a bit smaller than λ. Suppose the number of pulses in the strong blocks
and that in the weak blocks are equal. In the strong blocks, Alice’s real transmittance
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for a decoy pulse or a signal pulse is λD+ = 1.01λD or λS+ = 1.01λD while in the weak
blocks, Alice’s real transmittance for a decoy pulse or a signal pulse is λD− = 0.99λD or
λS− = 0.99λS. Suppose every block contains millions of pulses therefore Eve can know
whether a block is a strong block or a weak block by observe the averaged intensity of pulses
in the block. This is to say, Eve can treat different blocks differently. Eve produces a channel
transmittance of η+ to each pulses in the strong blocks and another transmittance η− to
each pulses in weak pulses. Note that here Eve does not know which pulses are decoy pulses
and which pulses are signal pulses. She treats all pulses in one block fixed way. Now we can
directly calculate Y D10,1 and Y
S
10,1:
Y D10,1 =
λD+(1− λD+)9η+ + λD−(1− λD−)9η−
λD+(1− λD+)9 + λD−(1− λD−)9 =
1.01(1− 1.01λD)9η+ + 0.99(1− 0.99λD)9η−
1.01(1− 1.01λD)9 + 0.99(1− 0.99λD)9
(61)
Y S10,1 =
λS+(1− λS+)9η+ + λS−(1− λS−)9η−
λS+(1− λS+)9 + λS−(1− λS−)9 =
1.01(1− 1.01λS)9η+ + 0.99(1− 0.99λS)9η−
1.01(1− 1.01λS)9 + 0.99(1− 0.99λS)9
(62)
It’s easy to see that in general Y D10,1 6= Y S10,1 if η+ 6= η−. For example, given that η+ = 5η−,
numerical calculation shows that
Y D10,1
Y S10,1
> 1.0025 (63)
This counter example shows that in general the assumption Y Dm,n = Y
S
m,n is incorrect if
Alice’s transmittance is not exactly controlled. We have demonstrated this fact with a pulse
containing 10 photons, one can also consider a pulse containing 107 photons and shall find
very similar result: Eve. can make Y D
107,1
significantly different from Y S
107,1
. This has clearly
broken the elementary assumption used in [29]. Obviously, such a case is equivalent to say
that the pulse intensity from Alice is inexact, this is just the case we have studied in [28].
As was clearly shown there and also in[10], Eve can produce different transmittance for the
single-photon state from the decoy source and the signal source. If Alice can control the
attenuation exactly, i.e., λD, λS, there exists more efficient way to manage the issue in the
protocol of one-way quantum communication[27].
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